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an ultimatum mini game. Gale et al. [1995] show that only selﬁsh behaviour
survivesinthe deterministicreplicator dynamicsunder therandom matching
rule. In contrast, this paper shows that, under an assortative matching rule,
the fair behaviour may survive at an asymptotically stable state.
1 Introduction
Why would people behave in a fair manner, sacriﬁcing their own monetary pay-
oﬀs. In the ultimatum game, selﬁsh individuals propose to exploit almost the total
surplus, and accept these unfair oﬀers as responders. Contrary to this standard
game theoretical prediction, many experimental data show that people tend to di-
vide the total surplus equally (e.g. Güth et al. [1982] and Binmore et al. [2002]).
This paper studies this paradox in the framework of the evolutionary game theory,
focusing on a matching rule.
Gale et al. [1995] consider the ultimatum mini game given in Figure 1. In the
game, agent 1 proposes either a high oﬀer (H) or a low oﬀer (L). If she adopts
strategy H, it is assumed that agent 2 (responder) always accepts it. If she adopts
strategy L, the responder decides to accept (Y) or reject (N) it. Let x1 and x2 be
proportionsofindividualsadoptingactions LandY, respectively, inthepopulation
of proposers and responders, respectively.
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Figure 1: The ultimatum mini game.
The standard replicator dynamics is described as
˙ x1 =g1(x) = x1(fL − ϕ1)
˙ x2 =g2(x) = x2(fY − ϕ2),
where fk is the ﬁtness of individuals adopting action k (k = L,Y), and ϕi is the av-
erage ﬁtness of population i = 1,2. In the ultimatum mini game given in Figure 1,
it holds that
g1(x) = x1(1 − x1)(3x2 − 2)
g2(x) = x2(1 − x2)x1.
Gale et al. [1995] show that it is a unique asymptotically stable state of the de-
terministic replicator dynamics that all proposers will make the selﬁsh oﬀer (L)
and all responders will accept it (Y). That is, only the unfair behaviour survives in
the replicator dynamics under the random matching rule. Thus, the paradox still
holds.
To represent an evolutionary drift, Gale et al. [1995] and Binmore and Samuel-
son [1999] introduce the following perturbed selection dynamics,
˙ x = g(x) + h(x).
If a drift function h is strictly decreasing in a diﬀerence between the largest and
the smallest expected payoﬀs, there exists an asymptotically stable state which is
an imperfect Nash equilibrium leading to the fair allocation. The asymptotically
stable state, however, critically depends on the form of h (Binmore and Samuelson
[1999]). For example, if h is not sensitive to payoﬀs, then only the subgame
perfect equilibrium is asymptotically stable.
Unlike these previous approaches, this paper studies how a matching rule af-
fects the evolution of fairness. Especially, we consider an assortative matching
rule which is introduced by Becker [1973, 1974]. The assortative matching rule
2is a matching rule under which similar types of individuals are paired more often
than under the random matching rule.
Under the assortative matching rule, an interaction rate between individuals
depends on their own actions in contrast to the random matching rule. This prop-
erty leads to the replicator dynamics with non-linear ﬁtness functions (Taylor and
Nowak [2006]). In symmetric 2 × 2 strategic form games, Taylor and Nowak
[2006] introduce a generalized matching rule with non-uniform interaction rates.
They show that the non-uniform interaction rates generate interior equilibria even
if one strategy dominates another. Bergstrom [2003] introduces another kind of
the assortative matching rule in the prisoners’ dilemma game. Taylor and Nowak
[2006] and Bergstrom [2003] show that cooperation survives under the assortative
matching rule in the prisoners’ dilemma game.
The main result of this paper is that, under an assortative matching rule, there
exist asymptotically stable states at which the fair allocation may prevail. Espe-
cially, if the matching rule is completely assortative, there exist only two asymp-
totically stable states, the fully fair equilibrium and selﬁsh equilibrium. The re-
sults provide an evolutionary support for the fair allocation which has been ob-
served by many experiments in the ultimatum game.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes an assortative matching
rule and the selection dynamics of the ultimatum mini game. Section 3 presents
the main results. Section 4 gives an example of an assortative matching rule.
Section 5 discusses the results.
2 The Model
There are two populations, proposers (population 1) and responders (population
2). The sizes of the two populations are equal. In each period, an agent in one
population matches with an agent in the other population according to a predeter-
mined matching rule. Each pair of agents plays the ultimatum mini game given in
Figure 1.
We call a proposer selﬁsh if she adopts strategy L, and fair if she adopts H.
Similarly, we call a responder selﬁsh if he adopts strategy Y, and fair if he adopts
N. Let x1 denote the proportion of selﬁsh proposers in population 1, and x2 denote
the proportion of selﬁsh responders in population 2, respectively. A state of the
system is represented by a pair x = (x1, x2). For a technical reason, we assume that
the range of xi is [ϵ,1 − ϵ] for all i = 1,2 where ϵ is a suﬃciently small positive
number 1.
1If this assumption does not hold, the matching rule (pi,qi)i=1,2 are not Lipschitz continuous








Figure 2: The matching probability in population 1: p1 = Pr(L meets Y), q1 =
Pr(H meets N).
Now, we deﬁne a matching rule as a pair (pi(x),qi(x))i=1,2 of two functions on
[ϵ,1−ϵ]×[ϵ,1−ϵ], where pi(x) is the probability that a selﬁsh agent in population
i meets a selﬁsh agent in population j and qi(x) is the probability that a fair agent
in population i meets a fair agent in population j at state x (Figure 2).
Deﬁnition 1. (pi(x), pj(x))i=1,2 is a matching rule if for all i = 1,2, pi(x) and qi(x)
are Lipschitz continuous on [ϵ,1 − ϵ] × [ϵ,1 − ϵ] 2, and satisﬁes
lim
xj→0
pi(x) = 0, lim
xj→1





qi(x) = 0, lim
xj→0
qi(x) = 1, lim
xi→0
qi(x) = 1 − xj,
and for all x ∈ [ϵ,1 − ϵ] × [ϵ,1 − ϵ],
xipi = xjpj, (1)
(1 − xi)qi = (1 − xj)qj, (2)
(1 − pi)xi = (1 − qj)(1 − xj). (3)
Equations (1), (2), and (3) are parity equations which imply that probability
functions pi and qi are consistent as a matching rule. All players can be paired
as long as these equations are satisﬁed. Note that if one of p1, p2, q1, or q2 is
determined, then the other valuables is automatically determined by using these
conditions. The random matching rule assumes that pi(x) = qi(x) = xj for all i
and j (i , j).
Under an assortative matching rule, similar types of agents are matched more
often than under the random matching rule.
2The function p is Lipschitz continuous if for any x,y ∈ [ϵ,1 − ϵ] × [ϵ,1 − ϵ], there exists a
constant k such that | p(y) − p(x) |< k | y − x |.
4Deﬁnition 2. A matching rule (pi,qi)i=1,2 is assortative, if for all i = 1,2, pi and
qi satisfy the following conditions:




(ii) pi(x) > xj and qi(x) > 1 − xj.
(iii) limxi→0 pi(x) > xj and limxi→1 qi(x) > 1 − xj .
An assortative matching rule has two characteristics. First, by (i) and (ii), the
probability pi has a strictly higher value than the one under the random matching
rule and it increases as the frequency of their same type opponents increases.
Second, the increase of the selﬁsh type frequency xi causes the decrease of the
probability pi. Let AM be the set of assortative matching rules.
Next, we deﬁne the replicator dynamics, where the state space is [ϵ,1 − ϵ] ×
[ϵ,1 − ϵ].
Deﬁnition 3. The replicator dynamics with a matching rule (pi,qi)i=1,2 on [ϵ,1 −
ϵ] × [ϵ,1 − ϵ] is deﬁned by
˙ x1 = (x1 − ϵ)(fL − ϕ1) (4)
˙ x2 = (x2 − ϵ)(fY − ϕ2), (5)
where ϕi is the average payoﬀ of population i such that
ϕ1 = (x1 + ϵ)fL + (1 − x1 − ϵ)fH
ϕ2 = (x2 + ϵ)fY + (1 − x2 − ϵ)fN,
and fj (j = L,H,Y,N) is the expected payoﬀ for strategy j; fL = 3p1(x), fH = 2,
fY = p2(x) + 2(1 − p2(x)), and fN = 2q2(x).
Thus, the system is described as
˙ x1 = g1(x) = (x1 − ϵ)(1 − ϵ − x1)¯ ϕ1(x) (6)
˙ x2 = g2(x) = (x2 − ϵ)(1 − ϵ − x2)¯ ϕ2(x), (7)
where
¯ ϕ1(x) = 3p1(x) − 2
¯ ϕ2(x) = 2 − p2(x) − 2q2(x).
5Although this dynamics is not the standard replicator dynamics, it has the same
properties, regularity and monotonicity (Binmore and Samuelson [1999]). In this
selection dynamics, the growth rate is continuous on state space [ϵ,1−ϵ]×[ϵ,1−ϵ]
(regularity) and that a growth rate of a relatively low-payoﬀ action is smaller than
that of a relatively high-payoﬀ action (monotonicity).
Finally, we deﬁne some standard concepts of dynamic stability (e.g. Vega-
Redondo [2003]).
Deﬁnition 4. (1) A state x = (x1, x2) is a rest point of (4) and (5) if and only if
˙ x1 = 0 and ˙ x2 = 0.
(2) A state x∗ is an asymptotically stable point of (4) and (5) if and only if the
following two conditions hold:
(i) (Liapnov stability) Given any neighborhood U1 of x∗, there exists some
neighborhoodU2 of x∗, suchthatforanypath x = x(t), x(0) ∈ U2 implies
x(t) ∈ U1 for all t > 0.
(ii) There exists some neighborhood V of x∗ such that for any path x = x(t),
x(0) ∈ V implies limt→∞ x(t) = x∗.
3 Results
Proposition 1. Let R(a) be the set of all rest points of system (6) and (7) under








2)} ∪ {(0,c)|c ∈ [0,1]},
where (x′
1, x′
2) satisﬁes ¯ ϕ1(x′
1, x′
2) = 0 and ¯ ϕ2(x′
1, x′
2) = 0.
Proof. Obviously, (ϵ,ϵ),(ϵ,1−ϵ),(1−ϵ,ϵ),(1−ϵ,1−ϵ) are rest points of (6) and
(7). Next, we show that there exists no a ∈ AM under which there exists some x1
satisfying ¯ ϕ1(x1,1−ϵ) = 0. Suppose that ¯ ϕ1(x1,1−ϵ) = 0. Then, p1(x1,1−ϵ) = 2
3.
This implies p2(x1,1−ϵ) = 2
3(1−ϵ)x1 by parity equations (1) and (3). However, this
contradicts condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 2 (p2 > x1) when ϵ is suﬃciently small.






2 satisfying ¯ ϕ1(x′
1, x′
2) = 0, ¯ ϕ2(x′
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2) = 0, ¯ ϕ1(x′′
1,ϵ) = 0, ¯ ϕ2(ϵ, x′′
2) =
0, and ¯ ϕ2(1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) = 0. Deﬁne an assortative matching rule a′ = (pi,qi)i=1,2 as




6where α ∈ (0,1]. Under this a′, when α = 1,3 (x′
1, x′
2), (x′′




exist, and when α = 1/2, (ϵ, x′′
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By (6) and (7), there exist no other rest points under any assortative matching
rule. Thus, for suﬃciently small ϵ,
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1 converges to 0 as ϵ goes to 0. Since ¯ ϕ2(1−ϵ, x′′′
2 ) = 0 and p2,q1 ≤ 1, we
obtain
2 = p2(1 − ϵ, x
′′′
2 ) + 2q2(1 − ϵ, x
′′′
2 )
= p2(1 − ϵ, x
′′′












2 ≥ 1−2ϵ. Hence, x′′′
2 convergesto1asϵ goesto0. Sincelimϵ→0 p2(ϵ, x′′
2) =
0 and limϵ→0 q2(ϵ, x′′
2) = 1, any x′′
2 ∈ [ϵ,1 − ϵ] satisﬁes limϵ→0 ¯ ϕ2(ϵ, x′′
2) = 0.





2)} ∪ {(0, x2) | x2 ∈ [0,1]}.

Since any x with x1 = 0 is in R, the equal allocation is supported as a rest
point of the replicator dynamics (6)-(7). The following proposition shows that the
equal allocation is asymptotically stable.
Proposition 2. Let A(a) be the set of asymptotically stable points under an assor-




{(1,1)} ∪ {(0, x2)|x2 ∈ [0,1/2)}.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the two claims.
3This rule is equal to a rule in section 4.
7Claim 1. There exists no assortative matching rule under which either (ϵ,1 − ϵ)
or (1 − ϵ,ϵ) is asymptotically stable.






     
(1 − 2ϵ)(3p1(ϵ,1 − ϵ) − 2) 0
0 (2ϵ − 1)(2 − p2(ϵ,1 − ϵ) − 2q2(ϵ,1 − ϵ))

     
=

     
(1 − 2ϵ)(3p1(ϵ,1 − ϵ) − 2) 0
0 (2ϵ − 1)(2 − 2−ϵ
1−ϵ p1(ϵ,1 − ϵ))

     .
It is well-known that a rest point of the system is asymptotically stable if and
only if the real parts of both eigenvalues of the Jacobian are negative (e.g. Arnold
[2006]). Thus, (ϵ,1−ϵ) is asymptotically stable if and only if
2(1−ϵ)
2−ϵ < p1(ϵ,1−ϵ) <
2
3. Since p1(ϵ,1 − ϵ) > 1 − ϵ by (ii) in Deﬁnition 2, p1(ϵ,1 − ϵ) < 2
3 is impossible
for suﬃciently small ϵ. We can show that (1−ϵ,ϵ) is not asymptotically stable by
the same procedure.
Claim 2. If there exists x′ = (x′
1, x′
2) which satisﬁes ¯ ϕ1(x′) = 0 and ¯ ϕ2(x′) = 0,
then x′ is a saddle point under any assortative matching rule.
Since ¯ ϕ1(x′) = 0, p1(x′) = 2









(1)-(3). Thus, we obtain x′
2 = 1
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∂¯ ϕ1(x′)
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     
=

     
(x′



















     .
In this matrix, one eigenvalue is negative and the other is positive. Therefore,
(x′
1, x′
2) is a saddle point.
By claims 1 and 2, it suﬃces us to construct assortative matching rules under
which x = (x′′
1,ϵ), (ϵ, x′′
2), (1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ), (ϵ,ϵ), and (1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ) are asymptotically
stable for suﬃciently small ϵ. First, we consider x = (ϵ,ϵ). The Jacobian matrix





     
(1 − 2ϵ)(3p1(ϵ,ϵ) − 2) 0
0 (1 − 2ϵ)(2 − p2(ϵ,ϵ) − 2q2(ϵ,ϵ))

     
=

     
(1 − 2ϵ)(3p1(ϵ,ϵ) − 2) 0




     
8by (1)-(3). If an assortative matching rule satisﬁes 2ϵ
1+ϵ < p1(ϵ,ϵ) < 2
3, then both
eigenvalues are negative. If we consider the rule (8) with α = 1/10, these condi-
tions are satisﬁed. Hence, (ϵ,ϵ) is asymptotically stable if these conditions are sat-
isﬁed. Assortative matching rules, under which other points, (x′′
1,ϵ), (1−ϵ,1−ϵ),
(1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ), and (ϵ, x′′
2) are asymptotically stable for suﬃciently small ϵ, are cal-
culated by the same procedure. Therefore, we obtain
A = {(ϵ,ϵ),(1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ),(x
′′








2 satisfy ¯ ϕ1(x′′
1,ϵ) = 0, ¯ ϕ2(ϵ, x′′
2) = 0, and ¯ ϕ2(1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) = 0.
For each x ∈ A, the conditions that x is asymptotically stable for suﬃciently
small ϵ are given by the followings:
(i) (ϵ,ϵ) is asymptotically stable if an assortative matching rule satisﬁes
2ϵ
1 + ϵ
< p1(ϵ,ϵ) < 2/3.
(ii) (1−ϵ,1−ϵ) is asymptotically stable if an assortative matching rule satisﬁes
2
3



















(iv) (1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) is asymptotically stable if an assortative matching rule satisﬁes
2
3
< p1(1 − ϵ, x
′′′







(1 − ϵ, x
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9By Proposition 1, limϵ→0(x′′
1,ϵ) = (0,0) and limϵ→0(1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) = (1,1). By
parity equations (1)-(3), ¯ ϕ2(x) = 0 implies







2 < 1/2. Then, limϵ→0(ϵ, x2) ∈ {(0,c)|c ∈ [0,1/2)}. Thus, as
ϵ goes to 0, A converges to {(1,1)} ∪ {(0, x2)|x2 ∈ [0,1/2)}. 
Proposition 2 shows that imperfect Nash equilibria in (0,c), c ∈ [0,1/2), are
asymptotically stable under some assortative matching rules. We call each (0,c)
with c ∈ (0,1/2) a partially fair equilibrium where all proposers are fair but there
exist some selﬁsh responders, (0,0) the fully fair equilibrium where all agents
choose fair actions, and (1,1) the selﬁsh equilibrium where all agents choose self-
ish actions.
Proposition3. Thefullyfairequilibriumandtheselﬁshequilibriumareasymptot-
ically stable under any assortative matching rule satisfying
∂p1
∂x1(x′′
1,ϵ) < 0 where
¯ ϕ2(ϵ, x′′
2) = 0.
Proof. When p1(ϵ,ϵ) < 2/3, (ϵ,ϵ) is asymptotically stable since 2ϵ
1+ϵ < ϵ <
p1(ϵ,ϵ). When p1(ϵ,ϵ) ≥ 2/3, by
∂p1
∂x1(x′′
1,ϵ) < 0, (x′′
1,ϵ) is asymptotically stable.
Thus, the fully fair equilibrium (0,0) is asymptotically stable under any assorta-
tive matching rule satisfying
∂p1
∂x1(x′′
1,ϵ) < 0, while a partially fair equilibrium is
not always asymptotically stable4.
When 1 − ϵ
2−ϵ > p1(1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ), (1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ) is asymptotically stable since
p1(1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ) > 1 − ϵ > 2/3. When 1 − ϵ




(1 − ϵ, x
′′′
2 ) ≥









where ¯ ϕ2(1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) = 0. This implies, by x′′′
2 ≥ 1 − 2ϵ,
∂p1
∂x2
(1 − ϵ, x
′′′






Then, (1 − ϵ, x′′′
2 ) is asymptotically stable. Thus, the selﬁsh equilibrium (1,1) is
asymptotically stable under any assortative matching rule. 
Intuitively, fair responders are easy to encounter fair proposers than selﬁsh
responders by assortativity. Hence, if proposers are almost fair (x1 ≈ 0), then
strategy N generateshigheraveragepayoﬀthanstrategyY. Ifproposersarealmost
selﬁsh (x1 ≈ 1), in contrast, an average utility of strategy N is smaller than an
average payoﬀ of strategy Y. Therefore, the fully fair equilibrium and the selﬁsh
equilibrium coexist.
4A counter-example is given in section 4.
104 An Example
In this section, we give an example of a completely assortative matching rule
under which only the fully fair equilibrium and the selﬁsh equilibrium are asymp-
totically stable.
Deﬁnition 5. A matching rule (pi,qi)i=1,2 is called completely assortative if the
matching probability in population 1 is deﬁned as
p1 =
{ x2




1−x1 if x1 ≤ x2
1 otherwise,
and the matching probability in population 2 is deﬁned as
p2 =
{ x1




1−x2 if x1 > x2
1 otherwise.
Figure 3 shows the probability with which selﬁsh proposers may meet selﬁsh
responders under this assortative matching rule and under the random matching
rule. As can be seen in Figure 3, fair proposers meet more likely fair responders
than selﬁsh proposers. The completely assortative matching rule maximizes a
number of pairs which consist of a fair proposer and a fair responder.
Under the completely assortative matching rule, the selection dynamics is de-
scribed as follows:
case 1: x1 > x2








case 2: x1 ≤ x2
˙ x1 = g1(x1, x2) = (x1 − ϵ)(1 − ϵ − x1)(3 − 2) (11)
˙ x2 = g2(x1, x2) = (x2 − ϵ)(1 − ϵ − x2)(
x1
x2























Figure 3: The probability p1 = Pr(L meets Y). The graph in left side is p1(x1,0.5).
The graph in right side is p1(0.5, x2).










Figure 4: Phase diagram under the completely assortative matching rule.
12This selection dynamics is a nonlinear dynamic system. Figure 4 shows the phase
diagram of the system (9)-(12).
Proposition 4. Let ¯ A be the set of asymptotically stable points of the system (9)-
(12). ¯ A = {(3
2ϵ,ϵ),(1 − ϵ,1 − 2ϵ)}.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the system (9)-(12) has the following set of
rest points,




ϵ,ϵ),(1 − ϵ,1 − 2ϵ)(3/4,1/2)}.
To prove the proposition, we examine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix.
In the case of x = (1 − ϵ,ϵ), the Jacobian matrix at (1 − ϵ,ϵ) is
∂g
∂x
(1 − ϵ,ϵ) =

     
( 3ϵ
1−ϵ − 2)(2ϵ − 1) 0
0 (1 − 2ϵ
1−ϵ)(1 − 2ϵ)

     .
Therefore, (1−ϵ,ϵ) is not asymptotically stable for suﬃciently small ϵ. Similarly,
we can show that x = (ϵ,1 − ϵ) is not asymptotically stable, either.
In the case of x = (1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ), it is not suﬃcient to consider the system in
only one case, since two case of the system is surely included the neighborhood
of (1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ). The both Jacobian at (1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ) in cases 1 and 2 are
∂g
∂x
(1 − ϵ,1 − ϵ) =

     
2ϵ − 1 0
0 1 − 2ϵ

     .
Therefore, (1−ϵ,1−ϵ) is a saddle point for suﬃciently small ϵ. We can show that
x = (3/4,1/2),(ϵ,ϵ) is not asymptotically stable but a saddle point in the same
manner.
Finally, we examine the case of x = (3









     
−2
3 + 5





     .
Thus, (3
2ϵ,ϵ) is asymptotically stable for suﬃciently small ϵ. We can show that
(1 − ϵ,1 − 2ϵ) is asymptotically stable in the same manner. 
Proposition 4 shows that only the selﬁsh equilibrium and the fully fair equilib-
rium survive in the replicator dynamics with the completely assortative matching
rule.
135 Discussion
In this paper, we have studied the role of matching rules in the replicator dynamics
in ultimatum mini game. If encounters are random, then Gale et al. [1995] shows
that the subgame perfect equilibrium is the only one asymptotically stable point.
However, many experimental observations do not support this result.
There are several possible explanations for fair actions. One explanation is
inequity aversion. Subjects’ preferences depend not only on their own monetary
payoﬀs but on fairness or equity (Bolton and Ockenfels [2000], Fehr and Schmidt
[1999]).
Another explanation is the reputation eﬀect. In repeated situation, people
worry about bad reputations and would act fairly (Nowak and Sigmund [1998],
Nowak et al. [2000], Ohtsuki and Iwasa [2004]). If responders accept any unfair
oﬀer, this may become known and the next proposer will make unfair oﬀers. To
act fairly improves their long-term payoﬀs even if their short-term payoﬀs de-
crease.
Here we have considered the evolutionof fair actions. An assortativematching
rule (Becker [1973, 1974], Shimer and Smith [2000], Atakan [2006]) can be re-
garded as an alternative explanation of fair actions. The assortative matching rule
make replicator dynamics to be a nonlinear system, and thus expands the set of
stable points. For the ultimatum mini game, there exist some assortative matching
rule supporting imperfect Nash equilibria. The average payoﬀ of fair actions may
become higher than selﬁsh actions depending on the mass of fair agents. There-
fore, the fair actions may survive. These assortative matching rules support fair
actions as asymptotically stable states without fair preference or reputation.
Our study has some limitations. First, the selﬁsh equilibrium is also asymp-
totically stable. The dynamic path depends on an initial state and an assortative
matching. Second, it is not known that the same result holds for other types of dy-
namics. The ultimatum “mini” game is surely restricted. The analysis of general
games in left for future works.
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